Achieving an Appropriate Balance: The Use of Counsel Sanctions in Connection with the Resolution of E-Discovery Misconduct by Allman, Thomas Y.
Richmond Journal of Law and Technology
Volume 15 | Issue 3 Article 5
2009
Achieving an Appropriate Balance: The Use of
Counsel Sanctions in Connection with the
Resolution of E-Discovery Misconduct
Thomas Y. Allman
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/jolt
Part of the Evidence Commons, and the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Richmond Journal of Law
and Technology by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Thomas Y. Allman, Achieving an Appropriate Balance: The Use of Counsel Sanctions in Connection with the Resolution of E-Discovery
Misconduct, 15 Rich. J.L. & Tech 9 (2009).
Available at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/jolt/vol15/iss3/5






ACHIEVING AN APPROPRIATE BALANCE:  THE USE OF 
COUNSEL SANCTIONS IN CONNECTION WITH THE 
RESOLUTION OF E-DISCOVERY MISCONDUCT 
 
By: Thomas Y. Allman* 
 
 
Cite as:  Thomas Y. Allman, Achieving an Appropriate Balance:  The Use 
of Counsel Sanctions in Connection with the Resolution of E-Discovery 




I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
[1]  This article evaluates the increased use of counsel sanctions in 
connection with discovery misconduct in the federal courts.1  Decisions 
such as Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp. (Qualcomm)2 have drawn 
attention to the affirmative responsibilities of counsel for discovery and 
the ample authority available to sanction them under appropriate 
circumstances.  In particular, courts have revived Rule 26(g) of the 
                                                 
* ©Thomas Y. Allman.  Tom Allman served as General Counsel of a major corporation.  
He currently chairs the Sedona Conference® Working Group on E-Discovery and was an 
early advocate of what came to be the 2006 E-Discovery Amendments to the Federal 
Rules.  He is one of the Editors of the Sedona Principles (Second Ed. 2007) and a 
forthcoming PLI E-Discovery Handbook (Spring, 2009).   
1 See Sheri Qualters, 25 Percent of Reported E-Discovery Opinions in 2008 Involved 
Sanctions Issues, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 17, 2008, available at 
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202426805975&rss=newswire (reporting that 
25% of the opinions issued in the first 10 months of 2008 involved sanctions for the 
mishandling of electronic discovery).   
2 No. 05cv1958-B (BLM), 2008 WL 66932 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008), partially vacated 
and remanded, No. 05CV1958-RMB (BLM), 2008 WL 638108 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2008). 
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for duty and blended ethical principles 
into the sanctions mix to motivate changes in counsel behavior.3    
 
[2]  When properly applied, counsel sanctions serve as a useful deterrent 
to misconduct.  The threat of sanctions, however, also carries the potential 
for creating unproductive tension in client relationships, especially 
between in-house counsel who supervise litigation and outside counsel 
retained to provide trial court expertise and advice.  This comes at a 
crucial time.  Clients in a position to do so are dedicating qualified e-
discovery personnel to team efforts involving outside counsel, internal 
resources and third party consultants.  An increase in finger-pointing and 
defensive posturing that may result when the dynamics of that effort are 
not respected is not conducive to full development of this positive trend. 
 
[3]  The purpose of discovery sanctions is to compel compliance, 
remediate prejudice, and deter others from similar misconduct.4  This 
article suggests that courts can best achieve that goal by maintaining a 
primary focus on client responsibility for misconduct, absent egregious 
counsel conduct, coupled with a mild presumption against costly detours 
involving a “Pandora’s Box”5 of post-engagement battles between client 
and counsel.6 
II.  TRIGGERING THE AUTHORITY TO SANCTION 
 
[4]  While there may once have been a general reticence on the part of 
Federal Courts to impose discovery sanctions on counsel,7 that restraint is 
                                                 
3 See David Cross & Ty Carson, Ethics and E-Discovery—“Reasonable Inquiry” in the 
Wake of Qualcomm v. Broadcom: Part I of II, 8 DIGITAL DISCOVERY & E-EVIDENCE 
REPORT 375, 378 (Dec. 1, 2008) (“Thus, one could argue, a lawyer’s duty under Federal 
Rule 26(g) . . . is an ethical duty to make a reasonably diligent effort to comply with a 
proper discovery request.”). 
4 See Poole v. Textron, Inc., 192 F.R.D. 494, 505-06 (D. Md. 2000). 
5 Tom Allman, Pandora’s Box: Compliance Quagmires Can Alienate Legal Teams, 15 L. 
TECH. NEWS 26 (2008) (“Opening up sensitive issues of relative fault among employed 
and retained counsel and their clients can be akin to opening Pandora’s Box.”). 
6 The party responsible for satisfying the duties created by a sanction is not always the 
one whose conduct triggered the authority to sanction.  See infra Part III.   
7 Charles R. Nesson, Incentives to Spoliate Evidence in Civil Litigation: The Need for 
Vigorous Judicial Action, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 793, 806 (1991) (“[I]n practice, judges 
are extremely reluctant either to expose discovery violations or to punish discovery 
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long past in this era of “managerial judging”8 and electronically stored 
information.  Cases like Qualcomm, with its sanctions on both counsel and 
client, have sent “ripples of fear through the litigation community and in-
house counsel managing or supervising litigation.”9  
 
[5]  Nonetheless, the imposition of sanctions on counsel for discovery 
misconduct10 remains a relatively isolated occurrence and properly so.  
Attorneys are professionals, whether employed by one client or serving as 
independent litigation counsel retained on an ad hoc basis to render 
services in specific cases.  As such, they can be expected to honor ethical 
standards of professionalism and by-and-large must do so to maintain their 
own standing and reputation.11  
 
[6]  An emerging goal in counsel sanctions in the recent e-discovery cases, 
when they do occur, is to induce counsel to improve discovery behavior 
either in the case at hand or, by example, in future litigation.12  As noted 
recently in the case of In re September 11th Liability Insurance Coverage 
Cases,13 where client and counsel were sanctioned jointly, “[d]iscovery is 
                                                                                                                         
violations once exposed, applying the rules instead in ways that minimize or avoid the 
problem.”). 
8See Thomas D. Rowe, Authorized Managerialism Under the Federal Rules—and the 
Extent of Convergence with Civil-Law Judging, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 191, 199, 202 (2007) 
(summarizing the “extensive and proactive management authority” given judges today 
including the ability to “impose a broad range of sanctions in connection with discovery 
disputes and misconduct.”). 
9 Debra Bernard, Qualcomm v. Broadcom: How Many Red Flags Does It Take?, INTELL. 
PROP. TODAY, July 2008, at 30, available at 
http://www.perkinscoie.com/files/upload/CHI_08_07_DebraBernardIPArticle.pdf. 
10 This article is focused only on substantive discovery misconduct in the civil context 
and not on the types of activity which generate comparatively de minimis sanctions.  See 
Petit-Phare v. City of New York, No. CV20044046ARRMDG, 2005 WL 2548257, at *2 
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2005) (imposing sanctions of $100 against counsel and client under 
Rule 37(b)(2)).  
11 See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. & scope (2009) (discussing 
the responsibilities of lawyers). 
12 See Sybil Louise Dunlop, Note, Are an Empty Head and a Pure Heart Enough? Mens 
Rea Standards for Judge-Imposed Rule 11 Sanctions and Their Effects on Attorney 
Action, 61 VAND. L. REV. 615, 641 (2008) (arguing that the threat of negligence liability 
can induce organizations and individuals to adopt new methods to prevent future 
sanctions). 
13 243 F.R.D. 114 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
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run largely by attorneys, and the court and the judicial process depend 
upon [appropriate conduct] among attorneys.”14   
 
[7]  The primary focus is on counsel of record.  Courts typically treat full 
time “corporate” counsel,15 hereinafter referred to as “in-house counsel,” 
as aligned with the clients’ interests for purposes of analysis.16  This self-
imposed restraint avoids issues involving non-parties who neither appear 
in nor directly participate before the court.17  Courts, however, do not 
hesitate to criticize in-house counsel where their conduct is at issue.18 
 
A.  RESPONSIBILITY FOR DISCOVERY COMPLIANCE 
 
[8]  Attorneys have an affirmative responsibility not only to carefully 
advise a client of its preservation and discovery obligations, but also to 
take reasonable and appropriate measures to assure that these obligations 
are met.19  Failures by counsel to carry out these responsibilities can 
support the imposition of sanctions against the client or counsel or both, at 
the discretion of the trial court.20   
 
[9]  These obligations arise under a mixture of sources, including rule-
based and statutory authority as well as the common law.  For example, 
where orders compelling discovery or other discovery tools are involved, 
                                                 
14 Id. at 125. 
15 Robert Eli Rosen, The Inside Counsel Movement, Professional Judgment and 
Organizational Representation, 64 IND. L. J. 479, 479 (1989) (“Inside counsel—lawyers 
who are employees of private business corporations—now are being called ‘corporate 
counsel.’”).  
16 Telectron, Inc. v. Overhead Door Corp., 116 F.R.D. 107, 137 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (holding 
that corporation is responsible for actions of in-house counsel who destroyed 
information). 
17 See McGuire v. Sigma Coatings, Inc., 48 F.3d 902, 907-08 (5th Cir. 1995) (reversing 
sanctions levied on in-house counsel). 
18 See Wachtel v. Health Net, Inc., 239 F.R.D. 81, 94-96 & nn.32-33, 103 (D.N.J. 2006) 
(stating that defendant, acting through its in-house counsel, “chose not to disclose” to 
outside counsel that its email system automatically removed email from active files). 
19 See Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 72-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) 
(holding that the “obligation [runs] first to counsel, who [has] a duty to advise [the] client 
of the type of information potentially relevant to the lawsuit and of the necessity of 
preventing its destruction,” with the “corporate managers” being “responsible for 
conveying this information to the relevant employees”). 
20 See id. at 72. 
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Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that counsel 
advising clients regarding discovery matters must undertake the necessary 
efforts needed to achieve adequate results.21  Moreover, under Rule 
26(g),22 counsel must make a “reasonable inquiry” to ascertain that an 
appropriate effort has been made to comply with discovery requirements 
before they sign discovery filings of any type.23   
 
[10]  Counsel are also subject to an obligation not to vexatiously multiply 
litigation, including discovery.24  Finally, and more generally, attorneys of 
record incur responsibility for discovery as an incident to their 
professional obligation, as “officers of the court,” to act in good faith in 
connection with proceedings before a tribunal.25   
 
[11]  In the seminal case of Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake 
V),26 for example, the court opined that “counsel27 is responsible for co-
                                                 
21 See Devaney v. Cont’l Am. Ins. Co., 989 F.2d 1154, 1163 (11th Cir. 1993) (affirming 
sanction of counsel under Rule 37(a) for failures relating to professional disposition of 
that portion of a lawsuit); see also Stuart I. Levin & Assocs., P.A. v. Rogers, 156 F.3d 
1135, 1141 (11th Cir. 1998) (upholding sanctions under Rule 37 on attorney of record 
who delegated portion of responsibility to associate). 
22 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g) (providing that "[t]he signature of the attorney or party constitutes 
a certification that to the best of the signer’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed 
after a reasonable inquiry, the disclosure is complete and correct as of the time it is 
made”).  The certification also means that the “request, response, or objection” is “not 
interposed for any improper purpose” and is “not unreasonable or unduly burdensome or 
expensive” in the case.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(2); see FED. R. CIV. P. 11(d) (analogous 
duties under Rule 11 as to pleadings and other court filings, does not apply to 
“disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections, and motions that are subject to 
the provisions of Rules 26 through 37”). 
23 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note, subdiv. (g) (“Rule 26(g) imposes an 
affirmative duty to engage in pretrial discovery in a responsible manner that is consistent 
with the spirit and purposes of Rules 26 through 37.”). 
24 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2006). 
25 See Mark A. Willard, The Duty to Preserve and Collect Electronic Evidence, 6 LAW.  J. 
6 (2004) (“Counsel has a duty, as officers of the court, and under the Rules of 
Professional Conduct to ensure that evidence that one may reasonably anticipate may 
later become relevant is preserved.”). 
26 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).  In a series of opinions written in 2003 and 2004, 
Judge Shira Sheindlin of the Southern District of New York famously dealt with e-mail-
related preservation obligations in the context of a single plaintiff discrimination action 
against her former employer.  See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake V), 229 
F.R.D. 422, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (addressing both “counsel’s obligation to ensure that 
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coordinating her client’s discovery efforts” and alluded to counsel’s 
failure “to properly oversee [defendant] . . . both in terms of its duty to 
locate relevant information and its duty to preserve and timely produce 
that information.”28     
 
[12]  In Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC v. Land O’Lakes, Inc.,29 R & R Sails 
Inc. v. Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania,30 and Board of Regents of 
University of Nebraska v. BASF Corp.,31 counsel were found to have 
violated an affirmative duty arising under Rule 26(g) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure to make a “reasonable inquiry” of their client about 
discovery efforts before signing discovery filings based on those 
inadequate efforts.32   
 
[13]  Rule 26(g) also played a major role in Qualcomm,33 which has 
caught the attention of the bar because of the severe sanctions imposed on 
outside counsel who failed to make adequate inquiries of their client.34  
The Qualcomm court acted because Qualcomm violated its discovery 
obligations by intentionally withholding production in an effort to win the 
                                                                                                                         
relevant information is preserved by giving clear instructions to the client to preserve 
such information and, perhaps more importantly, a client’s obligation to heed those 
instructions”). 
27 See id. at 432-35 (defining counsel as “both in-house and outside”).  
28 Id. at 435; Thomas Y. Allman, Ruling Offers Lessons for Counsel On Electronic 
Discovery Abuse, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER 1, 4 (2004), available at 
http://www.wlf.org/upload/101504LBAllman.pdf (“Outside counsel should become more 
directly involved in the initial planning for preservation in specific cases and should be 
prepared to affirmatively offer to oversee the ongoing preservation efforts of inside 
counsel while candidly commenting on any noted deficiencies.”).  
29 244 F.R.D. 614, 630 (D. Colo. 2007) (counsel “failed in many respects to discharge 
[the duty] to coordinate and oversee discovery.”). 
30 251 F.R.D. 520, 525 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (counsel incorrectly certified completeness of 
discovery). 
31 No. 4:04CV3356, 2007 WL 3342423 (D. Neb. Nov. 5, 2007); Id. at *5 (“[C]ounsel are 
required to direct the conduct of a thorough search . . . with due diligence and ensure all 
responsive documents . . . are produced.”). 
32 Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC, 244 F.R.D. at 630; R & R Sails Inc., 251 F.R.D. at 525; 
BASF Corp., 2007 WL 3342423, at *5-6. 
33 No. 05cv1958-B (BLM), 2008 WL 66932 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008), partially vacated 
and remanded, No. 05CV1958-RMB (BLM), 2008 WL 638108 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2008). 
34 Qualcomm Inc., 2008 WL 66932, at *17. 
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case and gain a strategic business advantage.35  The court found it 
“unbelievable” that outside counsel did not “know or suspect” that its 
client had not conducted an adequate search given the numerous warning 
flags.36  While in-house counsel and other members of the legal 
department were also mentioned, no explicit sanctions were levied on 
them.37 
 
[14]  According to Professor Marcus, the Special Reporter for the Civil 
Rules Advisory Committee effort leading to the 2006 Amendments, “e-
discovery [citing to Qualcomm] may breathe new life into Rule 26(g)” 
given the “extensive responsibilities” of counsel to make representations 
“about what can be done and when it can be done.”38 
 
B.  “REASONABLE INQUIRY” BY COUNSEL 
 
[15]  The “reasonable inquiry” required by Rule 26(g) is “the discovery 
analog to [Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure], mandating a 
reasonable inquiry before signing a disclosure, discovery request, or 
response.”39  The Advisory Committee enacted Rule 26(g) to provide a 
“deterrent to both excessive discovery and evasion by imposing a 
certification requirement that obliges each attorney to stop and think about 
the legitimacy of a discovery request, a response thereto, or an 
objection.”40  The reasonableness of counsel’s inquiry, prior to such 
                                                 
35 Id. at *9.  The Qualcomm case is said to be an example of a “patent ambush,” a 
controversial practice whereby a company fails to disclose relevant patents to standard-
setters until after the standard has been adopted.  See Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 
548 F.3d 1005, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (affirming in part and vacating in part underlying 
remedy ordered by District Court); see also Zusha Elinson, Patent Ambush Costs 
Qualcomm, THE RECORDER, Dec. 2, 2008, at 1, available at 
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202426407589 (quoting an expert to the effect 
that “even though the discovery debacle wasn’t central to the [appellate] ruling, it 
probably played an important role”). 
36 Id. at *12. 
37 See id. at *18 (requiring in-house lawyers to participate in certain post-trial remedial 
efforts designed to identify failures and craft alternatives).   
38 Richard L. Marcus, E-Discovery Beyond the Federal Rules, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 321, 
346 (2008) (“There may be a new or enlarged role for Rule 26(g), [which may] become 
the ‘new Rule 11.’”).   
39 Michael D. Berman, Give Peace a Chance: Lawyers Are Ethically Obligated to 
Cooperate in Discovery, 34 A.B.A. SEC. LITIG. NEWS 25 (2009). 
40 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 amendments advisory committee’s note subdiv. (g). 
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certification, need not be exhaustive, but merely reasonable under “totality 
of the circumstances.”41  It requires an assessment of the “thoroughness, 
accuracy and honesty (as far as counsel can reasonably tell) of the 
responses and the process through which they have been assembled.”42    
 
[16]  The test is whether a “reasonably competent” attorney43 would have 
recognized that the client failed to undertake an adequate or diligent 
search.44  A wide range of discovery inadequacies have been deemed to 
have been discoverable by counsel.  This has included the careless failure 
to check with obvious custodians45 or to clarify what is being sought,46 as 
well as failures to use elementary keyword searches47 or produce known 
test results48 or highly relevant documents and electronic information.49  
 
[17]  The assessment is to be made on an objective basis50 without 
unreasonable exercise of hindsight.51  In R & R Sails Inc. v. Insurance Co. 
                                                 
41 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g); see Poole v. Textron, Inc., 192 F.R.D. 494, 503 & n.11 (D. Md. 
2000).  
42 Poole, 192 F.R.D. at 503. 
43 Cf. Unioil, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 809 F.2d 548, 558-59 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding an 
attorney experienced in complex litigation to a higher standard).   
44 Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Neb. v. BASF Corp., No. 4:04CV3356, 2007 WL 
3342423, at *5 (D. Neb. Nov. 5, 2007) (“[C]ounsel are required to direct the conduct of a 
thorough search for responsive documents with due diligence.”). 
45 Cardenas v. Dorel Juvenile Group, Inc., No. CV.A.04-2478 KHV-DJW, 2006 WL 
1537394, at *4 (D. Kan. June 1, 2006) (explaining that the paralegal overlooked an 
obvious custodian). 
46 R & R Sails Inc. v. Ins. Co. of the State of Pa., 251 F.R.D. 520, 525 (S.D. Cal. 2008) 
(failing to recognize that an “electronic claim log” was sought as a “record/log”). 
47 Wingnut Films, Ltd. v. Katja Motion Pictures Corp., No. CV 05-1516-RSWL SHX, 
2007 WL 2758571, at *12 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2007) (failing to search through email 
servers for “Lord of the Rings” or other keywords); see Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom 
Corp., No. 05cv1958-B (BLM), 2008 WL 66932, at *13 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008) (“[A] 
reasonable inquiry should have included searches using fundamental terms . . . on the 
computers belonging to knowledgeable people.”). 
48 Clearvalue, Inc. v. Pearl River Polymers, Inc., 242 F.R.D. 362, 378 (E.D. Tex. 2007) 
(discussing a willful concealment of product tests). 
49 Qualcomm Inc., 2008 WL 66932, at *13 (holding that intentionally hiding or ignoring 
relevant documents and warning signs that client document search was inadequate). 
50  See Project 74 Allentown, Inc. v. Frost, 143 F.R.D. 77, 84 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (“[Rule 
26(g)] allows [a] court to impose sanctions on the signer of a discovery response when 
the signing of the responses . . . was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances.”). 
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of the State of Pennsylvania,52 for example, the court concluded that a 
failure to make a reasonable inquiry must have existed since production 
was made late in the discovery process.53  In National Ass’n. of Radiation 
Survivors v. Turnage,54 “a reasonable inquiry would have led to [missing 
document’s] preservation and inclusion in defendant’s discovery 
responses.”55  In A. Farber and Partners, Inc. v. Garber,56 the fact that a 
“paltry number” of documents were produced was proof that a reasonable 
inquiry had not been made.57  The danger in an overdependence on 
hindsight is particularly acute in the e-discovery context where the 
complexities defy easy explanation in retrospect. 
 
[19]  A “reasonable inquiry” often requires reliance on client 
representations about the adequacy of the search.58  Attorneys are entitled 
to “rely on assertions by the client” only “as long as that reliance is 
appropriate under the circumstances.”59  A client’s in-house counsel and 
other internal resources are particularly likely to be knowledgable about 
the nature and location of potential sources of discoverable information.60    
 
[20]  The ABA Civil Discovery Standards (“Discovery Standards”)61 
posits that counsel should “take reasonable steps to ensure that the client 
                                                                                                                         
51 Ideal Instruments v. Rivard Instruments, 243 F.R.D. 322, 342 (N.D. Iowa 2007) 
(concluding that counsel “shirked their responsibilities to conduct a reasonably 
investigation of or inquiry” about certain test results since “[a]ny reasonable inquiry 
would have demonstrated [its] obvious flaws”). 
52 251 F.R.D. 520 (S.D. Cal. 2008). 
53 Id. at 525. 
54 115 F.R.D. 543 (N.D. Cal. 1987). 
55 Id. at 557 n.4. 
56 234 F.R.D. 186 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 
57 Id. at 189. 
58 Compare Kamen v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 791 F.2d 1006, 1012 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding, 
in Rule 11 context, the reliance on client for information “reasonable” where it could 
“hardly be known to an outsider”), with BankAtlantic v. Blyth Eastman Paine Webber, 
Inc., 12 F.3d 1045, 1050 (11th Cir. 1994) (stating that outside counsel did not reasonably 
rely upon “its client and client’s in-house counsel’s representations”). 
59 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 amendments advisory committee’s note subdiv.(g).    
60 See Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc’n Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 550 (1991) 
(“Many corporate clients, for example, have in-house counsel who are fully competent to 
make the necessary inquiry.”). 
61 The ABA Civil Discovery Standards (2004) “are not a restatement of the law” but are 
intended to address “practical aspects” of the discovery process that may not be covered 
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understands (i) what documents are being requested [and] (ii) has adopted 
a reasonable plan to obtain [them].”62  
 
[21]  The ABA position seems reasonable.  It clearly reflects the fact that 
the Rule 26(g) certification is not equivalent to “verification,” a well-
established concept that appears elsewhere in the Federal Rules.63  As the 
District Court noted in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. 
New Horizon, Inc.,64  
 
Rule 26(g) does not require the signing attorney to certify 
the truthfulness of the client’s factual responses to a 
discovery request.  Rather, the signature [only] certifies that 
the lawyer has made a reasonable effort to assure that the 
client has provided all the information and documents 
available to him that are responsive to the discovery 
demand.65 
 
[22]  Some courts, unfortunately, treat outside counsel as virtual 
guarantors of discovery diligence and see very little room for reliance on 
client resources.  In Phoenix Four, Inc. v. Strategic Resources Corp.,66 the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York 
sanctioned retained counsel for violation of “counsel’s duty to locate 
relevant electronic information.”67   
 
C.  ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
[23]  The ethical obligations of in-house and outside counsel and their 
subordinates are governed by disciplinary professional responsibility 
                                                                                                                         
by rules.  See A.B.A. CIVIL DISCOVERY STANDARDS 1, available at 
http://www.abanet.org/litigation/discoverystandards/2004civildiscoverystandards.pdf. 
62 Id. at 21. 
63 See id. at 23. 
64 250 F.R.D. 203 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (refusing to award sanctions). 
65 Id. at 220. 
66 No. 05 Civ. 4837(HB), 2006 WL 1409413 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2006). 
67 Id. at *5. 
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codes based on the ABA Model Rules,68 typically promulgated and 
administered on a state-by-state basis.69   
 
[24]  An attorney is obligated to represent the interests of her clients, 
within the bounds of the law, with an undivided loyalty and with the 
diligence and zeal appropriate under the circumstances.70  Counsel must 
stay informed about legal developments,71 must “make reasonable efforts 
to expedite litigation,”72 and may not hinder or prevent the use of 
discoverable evidence nor assist another to do so.73 
 
[25]  Thus, in the area of discovery responsibilities, the “judicial vision of 
appropriate [attorney] behavior” embodied in the Federal Rules is 
essentially “identical to that of the bar.”74  Some courts and 
                                                 
68 The “Model Rules” are in effect in 48 states and the District of Columbia, excepting 
only California and Maine.  See Joel Stashenko, New Lawyer Conduct Rules Adopted; 
Standards Aligned with ABA Model, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 17, 2008, at 1.  See generally MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2009) (describing the ethical obligations of attorneys). 
69 District Courts (and appellate courts) often enact local rules incorporating the ethical 
codes of the jurisdictions in which they sit or—in some cases—simply refer to the Model 
Rules directly.  See Porter v. Arco Metals Co., 642 F. Supp. 1116, 1117 (D. Mont. 1986) 
(“Attorneys practicing before this Court are obligated to comply with the standards of 
professional conduct announced by the American Bar Association.”); see also Richards 
v. Jain, 168 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1200 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (“Federal courts have the 
authority to discipline attorneys appearing before them for conduct deemed inconsistent 
with ethical standards.”). 
70 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2009).  The Preamble also speaks of 
the duty to “zealously” assert a client’s position “under the rules of the adversary 
system.”  Id. pmbl. ¶ 2. 
71 Id. R. 1.1 cmt. 6 (a lawyer must “keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, 
engage in continuing study and education and comply with all continuing legal education 
requirements to which the lawyer is subject”). 
72 Id. R. 3.2. 
73 See id. R. 3.3 cmt. 12 (“Lawyers have a special obligation to protect a tribunal against 
criminal or fraudulent conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process, 
such as . . . unlawfully destroying or concealing documents or other evidence or failing to 
disclose information to the tribunal when required by law to do so.”); id. R. 3.4 (“A 
lawyer shall not . . . unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence or unlawfully 
alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary 
value.”). 
74 Fred C. Zacharias, Are Evidence-Related Ethics Provisions “Law”?, 76 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1315, 1319 (2007) (describing limited category of instances where courts have 
“adopted common law evidence principles that are coextensive with those in the 
professional codes”); see Paul W. Grimm, Ethical Issues Associated with Preserving, 
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commentators,75 however, see an inevitable tension between the duty of 
zealous advocacy and the ethical standards requiring principled behavior 
towards counsel and the court.76  Clearly, counsel may “not knowingly . . . 
make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal,”77 and must “avoid 
conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process.”78  The 
alleged tension is more theoretical than real, however, since the concept of 
loyalty to a client does not embrace knowing participation in discovery 
misconduct.  Counsel must use care not to “cross the line” between 
zealous advocacy and sanctionable conduct.79 
 
[26]  Where counsel is made aware of activity that runs the risk of 
violating the law in a manner likely to result in substantial injury to the 
entity, she must take reasonably necessary steps, which may ultimately 
require withdrawal from representation if appeals to higher authority are 
insufficient.80  Continued representation is not permissible if it will result 
in violation of the rules of professional conduct or other law.81  A lawyer 
                                                                                                                         
Accessing, Discovering, and Using Electronically Stored Information, 56 U.S. ATT’YS 
BULL. 1, 5-6 (May 2008), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usab5603.pdf. 
75 See Mary Twitchell, The Ethical Dilemmas of Lawyers on Teams, 72 MINN. L. REV. 
697, 749 (1988) (the dual role of lawyers as client advocates and officers of the court 
may cause some team members to consciously or unconsciously screen out discoverable 
information and rationalize improper choices as in their clients interests). 
76 Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Co., 987 F.2d 1536, 1546-47 (11th Cir. 1993) (criticizing 
the Model Rules as “underscor[ing] the duty to advocate zealously while neglecting the 
corresponding duty to advocate within the bounds of the law”).  A number of states have 
abolished the concept to avoid the perception that zealous advocacy is “a pretext for 
bullying, rude and sometimes frightening behavior.”  David D. Dodge, When Lawyers 
Behave Badly: The “Z” Word, Civility & the Ethical Rules, 44 ARIZ. ATT’Y 18, 19 & n.2 
(2008) (stating that Arizona, “Indiana, Louisiana, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, Oregon 
and Washington have omitted all reference to zealousness”). 
77 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a) (2009). 
78 Id. R. 3.3 cmt. 2 (“A lawyer acting as an advocate in an adjudicative proceeding has an 
obligation to present the client’s case with persuasive force. . . . [But a lawyer’s 
performance] is qualified by the advocate’s duty of candor to the tribunal. . . . [T]he 
lawyer must not allow the tribunal to be misled by false statements of law or fact or 
evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.”). 
79 Grider v. Keystone Health Plan, No. Civ.A.2001-CV-05641, 2007 WL 2874408, at *33 
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2007). 
80 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b). 
81 Id. R. 1.16(a)(1) (stating that a lawyer shall withdraw if “the representation will result 
in violation of the rules of professional conduct or other law”).  If the lawyer thinks a 
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may not assist a client to violate criminal law or to engage in fraudulent 
conduct.82  Finally, counsel must not reveal information relating to the 
representation83 of a current or past client nor represent such a client when 
a conflict of interest exists,84 absent “informed consent” or other specified 
conditions.85 
 
[27]  On a practical level, the closest ethical analogy to the certification 
requirement of Rule 26(g) is the duty imposed on a partner or a 
supervisory lawyer under the Model Rules86 to assure the ethical 
performance of lawyers and non-lawyers in a law firm.87  In that context, 
supervisors involved in discovery matters need to pay attention to the 
adequacy of communications, quality assurance, and appropriate training 
and peer review.88  Properly implemented, this approach should also help 
with compliance with Rule 26(g) obligations as well. 
 
[28]  While the supervisory lawyer analogy works well within law firms 
and legal departments, it can break down when applied to mixed discovery 
teams where outside counsel has limited direct responsibility.89  Clients 
                                                                                                                         
course of conduct is criminal or fraudulent or there is a “fundamental disagreement,” the 
lawyer “may withdraw,” subject to other conditions.  Id. R. 1.16(b). 
82 See KC Goyer, Note, Nancy Temple’s Duty: Professional Responsibility and the Arthur 
Anderson Verdict, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 261, 271-73 (2004). 
83 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2009).  
84 Id. R. 1.7(a); id. R. 1.9. 
85 See id. R. 1.6(a); id. R. 1.7(b)(4); id. R. 1.9(a)-(b); see also id. R. 1.6 cmt. 10 
(regarding a lawyer’s ability to use confidential information in connection with her “right 
to defend”); id. R. 1.7, cmt. 18 & 22 (discussing the elements of “informed consent” as to 
current conflicts as well as the requirements for waiver of “future conflicts”); id. R. 1.9, 
cmt. 9 (discussing the applicability of informed consent to former clients). 
86 Id. R. 5.1; id. R. 5.3 (“[A] lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the 
nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the person’s conduct is compatible 
with the professional obligations of the lawyer . . . .”). 
87 As used in the Model Rules, a “firm” or “law firm” includes lawyers “employed [by] 
the legal department of a corporation or other organization.”  Id. R. 1.0(c). 
88 The SEC also uses the “supervisory attorney” approach to ensure that subordinate 
attorneys conform to applicable reporting requirements.  See Sara Helene Duggin, The 
Pivotal Role of the General Counsel in Promoting Corporate Integrity and Professional 
Responsibility, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 989, 1028-29 (2007) (stating that the chief legal 
officer must make reasonable inquiry once receiving report of potential material 
violation). 
89 See Irwin D. Miller, Preventing Misconduct by Promoting the Ethics of Attorney’s 
Supervisory Duties, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 259, 284-285 (1994) (it is “inappropriate” 
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are entitled to define the scope of representation by their counsel and a 
lawyer “shall abide by a client’s decisions” in that regard.90  As noted in 
the Comment to Model Rule 1.2, “the terms upon which representation is 
undertaken may exclude specific means,” including “actions that the client 
thinks are too costly.”91  Thus, while outside counsel may take the lead in 
some areas, resources not controlled by the law firm may be integrated 
into the team.92 
 
[29]  Where the client neither authorizes nor seeks to pay for the level of 
oversight sought by outside counsel, there is a potential for serious tension 
if Rule 26(g) is to be properly effected.93  Counsel should not be expected 
to ignore the considered wishes of their clients on staffing decisions and 
the balance to be applied between inside and outside resources.94  
Obviously, a heightened sensitivity to client concerns and creative 
adjustments are required to make the relationship work under those 
conditions.95 
                                                                                                                         
to expect a lawyer not in a position with management responsibility to be responsible for 
ethical conduct of another);  Cindy Holland, Comment, The Liabilities and Ethical 
Responsibilities of a Law Firm Associate, 16 J. LEGAL PROF. 241, 249 (1991) (describing 
complexities of exercising authority as applied to an associate in a supervisory role). 
90 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (a) (2009).  
91 Id. R. 1.2 cmt. 6. 
92 According to experts, “[I]f you can control and take any significant portion of the 
process in-house, you have the opportunity to save a great deal of money. . . . [You can 
also] greatly reduce the amount of material that must be outsourced.”  Interview by 
Editor of Metro. Corporate Counsel with Frank Wu, Managing Dir., Litigation, 
Restructuring and Investigative Services Solution Group, Protiviti Inc. (Jan. 2009), 
available at 
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/current.php?artType=view&EntryNo=9249. 
93 See generally Bratka v. Anheuser-Busch Co., Inc., 164 F.R.D. 448 (S.D. Ohio 1995) 
(sanctioning party which utilized in-house legal department to mitigate cost of discovery 
compliance without allowing outside counsel to supervise efforts). 
94 The most apt analogy is that of local counsel in the Federal Courts.  See David A. 
Mazie & Ben-David Seligman, Contractually Narrowing the Duties and Liability of a 
Mail Drop Local Counsel, N.J. LAW., Feb. 2006, at 16, 17 (assessing the impact of local 
New Jersey rules and stressing the need for informed consent of client to any restrictions 
on role of outside counsel). 
95 See Jonathan Putnam, Note, Catering to Our Clients: How In re Cater Exposes the 
Flaws in Model Rule 5.3—and How They Can Be Solved, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 925, 
926 & n.9 (2006) (arguing that Model Rule 5.1 creates a “duty to supervise that extends 
to all lawyers who oversee the work of another licensed attorney,” including “in-house 
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[30]  Regardless of whether the professional serves as a supervisor or not, 
however, counsel is not entitled to ignore clearly applicable ethical 
requirements.96  Ethical responsibilities are personal and cannot be 
delegated.  In the case of In re Estrada,97 it was noted that subordinate 
attorneys retain “an independent duty to the New Mexico judiciary to obey 
New Mexico’s ethical and discovery rules.”98  The court emphasized that 
the duty was not to the client or law firm but to the administration of 
justice.99 
 
[31]  Courts sometimes utilize the provisions of the Model Rules when 
analyzing the need for discovery sanctions.  In Qualcomm,100 the court 
stated, for example, that an “[a]ttorneys’ ethical obligations do not permit 
them to participate in an inadequate document search and then provide 
misleading and incomplete information to their opponents and false 
arguments to the court.”101  The magistrate judge also opined that had 
                                                                                                                         
counsel and government attorneys, as well as independent attorneys who only associate 
for a specific period of time”). 
96 Model Rule 5.2 carves out an exception for subordinate attorneys who are acting 
pursuant to a supervisory attorney’s “reasonable resolution of an arguable question of 
professional duty.”  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.2(b) (2009).  However, 
absent that exception, subordinate attorneys have independent ethical duties regardless of 
what they are told to do.  See Douglas R. Richmond, Professional Responsibilities of Law 
Firm Associates, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 199, 206 (2007) (stating that “[a] lawyer is bound by 
the Rules of Professional Conduct notwithstanding that the lawyer acted at the direction 
of another person”). 
97 143 P.3d 731 (N.M. 2006) (suspending associate in law firm from practice for one year 
based on ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1992)). 
98 Id. at 741; see Blue v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 914 F.2d 525, 546 (4th Cir. 1990) 
(holding sanctions vacated against associate who was left to try the case after her 
supervisor left as “an unrealistic and unjust result”).  The court also found a violation of 
the duty to not “unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to” documents or other 
materials, citing New Mexico rules and the ABA Model Rules 3.4.  In re Estrada, 143 
P.3d at 742.   
99 See In re Estrada, 143 P.3d at 741-42. 
100 No. 05cv1958-B (BLM), 2008 WL 66932 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008).  The United States 
District Court for the Southern District of California referred certain attorneys to the State 
Bar of California for investigation and possible imposition of sanctions of Rules 5-200 
and 5-220 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct.  Id. at *18.  The order was 
subsequently vacated and remanded on other grounds without reference to the referral.  
See Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05cv1958-RMB (BLM), 2008 WL 638108, 
at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2008). 
101 Qualcomm Inc., 2008 WL 66932, at *13 n.10. 
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counsel been unable to get their client to “conduct a competent and 
thorough document search, they should have withdrawn from the case or 
taken other action to ensure production of the evidence.”102 
 
[32]  Court challenges to attorney conduct in e-discovery disputes, 
however, are best resolved without reference to ethical principles.103  State 
disciplinary authorities, utilizing “specific rules of professional conduct . . 
. [and] protections provided by the state grievance procedures” are better 
equipped to handle such serious matters than sanction hearings with their 
broad discretion and expedited focus.104  It is not unusual for a court, in 
the heat of the moment, to find fault with counsel and form adverse 
conclusions which a more deliberative state bar disciplinary process may 
reject.105 
 
[33]  Not surprisingly, there is no clear consensus on when and to what 
extent federal courts should defer to the state disciplinary process.  Some 
courts do not hesitate to resolve “both the disciplinary and remedial 
questions in a single action.”106  The closest to a general principle that can 
be cited is the comment in W.T. Grant Co. v. Haines,107 that “‘[t]he 
business of the [federal] court is to dispose of litigation and not to act as a 
general overseer of the ethics of those who practice here unless the 
questioned behavior taints the trial of the cause before it.’”108   
 
                                                 
102 Id. 
103 See Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1542 (9th Cir. 
1986) (stating that enforcement of Rule 11 for “after-the-fact” review should not be based 
on assertions of unethical conduct, which are best left to “well-established bar and court 
ethical procedures”). 
104 William I. Weston, Court-Ordered Sanctions of Attorneys: A Concept That Duplicates 
the Role of Attorney Disciplinary Procedures, 94 DICK. L. REV. 897, 902-03 (1990) 
(criticizing sanctions as creating a separate and parallel system of attorney discipline that 
imposes a chilling effect on counsel by virtue of the vagueness of sanction rules and 
latitude of judicial discretion). 
105 See McGuire v. Sigma Coatings, Inc., 48 F.3d 902, 908 (5th Cir. 1995) (reversing sua 
sponte sanctions entered by district court after Texas State Bar refused to act against in-
house counsel in response to referral). 
106 Harlan v. Lewis, 982 F.2d 1255, 1260-61 (8th Cir. 1993) (proceeding to enforce 
ethical obligations where conduct tainted the case and a referral “could not have repaired 
the damage”). 
107 531 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1976). 
108 Id. at 677. 
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D.  SANCTIONING AUTHORITY 
 
[34]  The Second Circuit noted in Oliveri v. Thompson109 that 
“[u]nfortunately [there is no] integrated ‘code’ of sanctions to supply 
coherent guidance” when a court considers counsel sanctions.110  “[T]he 
sources of judges’ sanctioning power are diverse, and the standards 
invoked have not always been either clear or consistently applied.”111  
Even a cursory review of opinions relating to attorney sanctions confirms 
the accuracy of that statement. 
 
[35]  With the renewed emphasis on Rule 26(g) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, at least two rule-based options exist112 which may trigger 
the right to impose sanctions on counsel.  First, Rule 26(g)(3) mandates 
that “appropriate” sanctions issue when counsel has signed discovery 
filings without making a “reasonable inquiry” into the accuracy of the 
contents or the purpose behind the filing. 113 
 
[36]  Second, Rules 37(a)(5)(A), 37(b)(2)(C), and 37(d)(3) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure mandate that sanctions be issued when counsel 
has, without substantial justification, “advised” a disobedient party to 
oppose or fail to comply with discovery orders114 or otherwise delayed or 
impeded the use of specified discovery mechanisms.115  
                                                 
109 803 F.2d 1265 (2d Cir. 1986).  The United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit emphasized the need for a predicate showing of “bad faith” conduct to issue 
sanctions against counsel under the inherent power or 28 U.S.C. § 1927.  Id. at 1272-74. 
110 Id. at 1271.   
111 Id. 
112 Then District Judge Jose A. Cabrabes held in J.M. Cleminshaw Co. v. City of Norwich, 
that Rule 41(b) implicitly authorizes sanctions, including personal fines, against lawyers 
when “delays or disobedience have been the fault of counsel rather their clients.”  93 
F.R.D. 338, 355 (D. Conn. 1981); see FED. R. CIV. P.37(f) (authorizing sanctions against 
attorneys or parties who fail to participate in good faith in discovery planning process).   
113 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(3).  In Qualcomm Inc.  v. Broadcom Corp., the court held that 
under a “strict” reading of the rule, only the signing counsel would be liable for failure to 
make a reasonable inquiry, but opined that the “federal rules impose a duty of good faith 
and reasonable inquiry on all attorneys involved in litigation who rely on discovery 
responses executed by another attorney.”  No. 05cv1958-B (BLM), 2008 WL 66932, at 
*13 n.9 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008) 
114 When a motion to compel disclosure or discovery is denied, Rule 37(a)(5)(B) requires 
the moving party, the attorney “filing” the motion, or both to pay the party or deponent 
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[37]  Generally speaking, both Rule 26(g) and the various subsections of 
Rule 37 contemplate that sanctions may be imposed on the party, counsel, 
or both.  Rule 37 also requires that the sanctions be both “appropriate” and 
“just,” a limitation not imposed by Rule 26(g).116  Similarly, Rule 37 
permits sanctions against law firms,117 not just individual lawyers, as 
authorized under Rule 26(g).118   
 
[38]  In addition, courts can seek to impose sanctions under the authority 
of 28 U.S.C. § 1927, which applies when an attorney has multiplied 
proceedings “unreasonably and vexatiously.”119  This authority, however, 
requires a showing of bad faith conduct or conduct amounting to bad faith, 
judged objectively,120 or “recklessness” (but not mere “negligence”)121 
coupled with an improper purpose.122  A finding of liability requires “a 
high degree of specificity” that the activity was in bad faith and taken “for 
reasons of harassment or delay for other improper purposes.”123 
                                                                                                                         
who opposed the motion reasonable expenses incurred in opposing it.  FED. R. CIV. P. 
37(a)(5)(B). 
115 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(5)(A), (b)(2)(C), (d)(3). 
116 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(3)(A), (a)(4)(C). 
117 See Kyoei Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. M/V Mar. Antalya, 248 F.R.D. 126, 158 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (sanctioning law firm under Rule 37(d)); In re Simonson, Nos. 04-
15846, 06-01235, 2008 WL 4830807, at *11 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. Oct. 27, 2008) 
(sanctioning law firm for “the most serious allegation of discovery misconduct the Court 
has encountered”). 
118 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g). 
119 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2006).  In relevant part, the statute provides that: 
 
Any attorney . . . admitted to conduct cases in any court of the Unites 
States . . . who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably 
and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the 
excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because 
of such conduct. 
 
Id. 
120 Sangui Biotech Int’l, Inc. v. Kappes, 179 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1245-46 (2002) (imposing 
sanctions on counsel under both Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 where counsel submitted 
misleading affidavit which showed “a reckless disregard for the duty owed by counsel to 
the court” with the result of multiplying the proceedings). 
121 Jones v. Sweeney, No. 1:04-CV-6214 AWI DLB, 2008 WL 5101471, at *2 (E.D. Cal. 
Dec. 2, 2008). 
122 Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.2d 989, 993-94 (9th Cir. 2001). 
123 Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1272 (2d Cir. 1986). 
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[39]  Finally, a court has inherent power to manage proceedings before it, 
which includes the power to sanction counsel for discovery abuse.124  In 
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.,125 the Supreme Court cautioned that the 
inherent power to sanction should be used sparingly, and only when 
counsel has acted in bad faith or has taken actions tantamount to bad faith 
for an improper purpose.126  As the Court explained, a sanctioning court 
“ordinarily should rely on the Rules rather than the inherent power.  But if 
in the informed discretion of the court, neither the statute nor the Rules are 
up to the task, the court may safely rely on its inherent power.”127 
 
[40]  Courts also have the inherent power to invoke civil contempt in order 
to maintain and preserve the sanctity of the court.128  This power has been 
directed against counsel in discovery disputes.129 
 
E.  PROCESS ISSUES (INCLUDING APPEALS) 
 
[41]  In cases involving counsel sanctions, a district court must have 
personal jurisdiction and “the attorney . . . must be given both fair notice 
that his or her conduct is sanctionable, and a meaningful opportunity to be 
heard, either orally or in writing.”130 
 
[42]  Acquiring personal jurisdiction over in-house counsel presents 
difficult issues.  In McGuire v. Sigma Coatings, Inc.,131 sanctions imposed 
                                                 
124 See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44-45 (1991). 
125 501 U.S. 32 (1991).  The United States Supreme Court stated that “the inherent power 
extends to a full range of litigation abuses.”  Id. at 46. 
126 Id. at 45-46, 46 & n.10; see Fink, 239 F.3d at 994 (including willful actions when 
combined with an additional factor such as frivolousness, harassment, or improper 
purpose). 
127 Chambers, 501 U.S. at 50. 
128 In re Fannie Mae Sec. Litig., No. 08-5014, 2009 WL 21528, at *9 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 6, 
2009) (ordering production by party under contempt power “for the purpose of resolving 
whether [documents not logged] were in fact privileged” as sanction for failure to meet 
stipulated dates). 
129 See In re Rosenthal, No. H-04-186, 2008 WL 983702, at *9 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 
2008). 
130 Phillips v. Berlex Labs., Inc., No. 3:05CV81 (CFD)(TPS), 2006 WL 1359124, at *2 
(D. Conn. May 11, 2006) (postponing hearing on “the circumstances surrounding the 
withholding” of documents until “the conclusion of all proceedings”). 
131 48 F.3d 902 (5th Cir. 1995) (reversing sanctions imposed on in-house counsel for lack 
of personal jurisdiction). 
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on an in-house counsel were reversed in the absence of prior notice that 
sanctions might lie against him.132  In E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown,133 
however, jurisdiction was found to exist over an outside counsel who had 
not formally appeared in the action but was actively “advising . . . and 
consulting” with local counsel in regard to litigation before the court.134 
 
[43]  The issue of discovery misconduct is often assessed in the first 
instance by a U.S. magistrate judge, with any “non-dispositive” sanctions 
reviewed by the district court under a “clearly erroneous” or “contrary to 
law” standard.135  Dispositive rulings, such as dismissal of the complaint 
or the entry of a default judgment, are made by district courts. 
 
[44]  A court need not conduct a mini-trial in order to impose sanctions.136  
The court can make findings “guided by its experience in litigation, its 
knowledge of the standards of the bar of the court, and its familiarity with 
the case before it, and by reference to the relevant criteria under the 
Federal Rules . . . .”137  Where client and counsel are both potentially 
subject to sanctions it may be necessary for clients to seek the advice of 
independent counsel.  Moreover, counsel may need to assert the “self-
defense” exception to the attorney-client privilege when required to 
defend itself against client accusations.138 
                                                 
132 Id. at 908.  The court also expressed “no opinion” as to whether jurisdiction over the 
in-house lawyer was possible under any procedure.  Id. 
133 305 F. Supp. 371 (S.D. Tex. 1969).  The United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Texas disqualifed New York counsel whose conduct was “intended to 
influence the court of litigation pending before [the court].”  Id. at 378. 
134 Id.; see Pumphrey v. K.W. Thompson Tool Co., 62 F.3d 1128, 1128-30 (9th Cir. 
1995) (ordering new trial under Rule 60(b) based on conduct of corporate counsel who 
served as de facto “officer of the court” within meaning of rule). 
135 Reino de España v. Am. Bureau of Shipping, Inc., No. 03 Civ. 3573 (LTS) (RLE), 
2008 WL 3851957, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2008) (stating that objections under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) overruled because “it cannot 
be said” that the magistrate’s conclusions were clearly erroneous or contrary to law). 
136 Devaney v. Cont’l Am. Ins. Co., 989 F.2d 1154, 1161-62 (11th Cir. 1993) (trial court 
has “broad discretion to apportion fault between them”). 
137 William W. Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11—A Closer Look, 
104 F.R.D. 181, 195 (1985).  “[T]he sanctions decision [should be] based on the face of 
the record, not on extraneous matters such as state of mind or the equities.”  Id. at 198. 
138 Model Rule 1.6 permits a lawyer to reveal information relating to representation 
without client waiver when necessary to establish a “claim or defense” on behalf of a 
lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and client or to respond to allegations 
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[45]  When appellate review is sought and accepted, the test applied is 
usually one of abuse of discretion, not review de novo.139  U.S. Courts of 
Appeals are quite reluctant to second guess lower courts, given their 
“intimate familiarity with the details of the discovery dispute” and the risk 
of undermining their authority.140  As the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit has stated, however, the authority to sanction is not a 
“roving commission for the district court to bludgeon violators of local or 
federal rules.”141   
 
[46]  Not all adverse findings about counsel are appealable.142  For 
example, in the absence of an “explicit reprimand or the issuance of some 
mandatory directive,” a court’s “criticism of an attorney is simply 
commentary made in the course of an action to which the attorney is, 
                                                                                                                         
concerning representation.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 1.6(b)(5); see 
Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 2007 WL 2900537, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2007) 
(finding that because Qualcomm filed declarations critical of its counsel, “the self-
defense exception to the attorney-client privilege” applies making communications and 
conduct relevant to the discovery “not privileged information”). 
139 See generally Robert B. Tannenbaum, Comment, Misbehaving Attorneys, Angry 
Judges, and the Need for a Balanced Approach to the Reviewability of Findings of 
Misconduct, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1857 (2008) (addressing the different approaches among 
the circuits). 
140 In re Fannie Mae Sec. Litig., No. 08-5014, 2009 WL 21528, at *8 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 6, 
2009) (stating that an appellate court is “ill-positioned to second-guess” the “fact-bound 
conclusion” that the party dragged its feet and should be sanctioned). 
141 Zambrano v. City of Tustin, 885 F.2d 1473, 1480 (9th Cir. 1989).  In Blue v. United 
States Department of the Army, the court noted that “the district court not only invoked 
every conceivable legal theory on which sanctions could be imposed, but also levied 
every conceivable sanction, including attorneys’ fees, court costs, court salaries 
(including that of its law clerk) and even a fine and reprimand of counsel for violation of 
state ethical rules.”  914 F.2d 525, 535 (4th Cir. 1990). 
142 See Carla R. Pasquale, Note, Scolded: Can an Attorney Appeal a District Court’s 
Order Finding Professional Misconduct, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 219, 223-25 (2008) 
(contrasting rule-based sanctions with those using the power of the written word to 
impress upon an attorney the gravity of conduct). 
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legally speaking, a stranger.”143  But aggrieved counsel may seek a writ of 
mandamus to have the offending actions or comment expunged.144  
 
F.  SELECTING AN APPROPRIATE SANCTION 
 
[47]  The “Civil Rules place virtually no limits on judicial creativity” in 
fashioning sanctions.145  For example, while Rule 37(b)(2)(A) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure lists some types of sanctions for 
violating an order to provide discovery, the listing “is neither exhaustive 
nor mutually exclusive, and  ‘the court may impose [more than one of the 
enumerated sanctions] at the same time.’”146  When acting “[u]nder [Rule] 
37 (a)(5) and (b)(2)(C), the court is required to impose monetary sanctions 
unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified or that 
other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.”147  A similar 
requirement exists under Rule 26(g)(3), where a certification that violates 
the rule without “substantial justification” must result in an “appropriate 
sanction.”148  
 
[48]  On the other hand, the decision as to what sanctions to impose—and 
on whom to impose them—is within the discretion of the trial court.149  
Ultimately, the sanction selected must “be proportionate to the offense and 
commensurate with the principles of restraint and dignity inherent in 
                                                 
143 Nisus Corp. v. Perma-Chink Sys., Inc., 497 F.3d 1316, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(characterizing an attorney as facilitating inequitable conduct relating to patent 
prosecution is not an appealable sanction).  But cf. Dawson v. United States, 68 F.3d 886, 
893-94 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that a reprimand coupled with an order to attend an ethics 
class is appealable). 
144 See Clare v. Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc., 928 So. 2d 1246, 1249 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2006) (finding that a revocation of  pro hac vice admission, especially in light of 
absence of misconduct of counsel in its role as “the messenger” about e-discovery 
misconduct, was a violation of due process rights). 
145 Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 900 F.2d 388, 394 (1st Cir. 1990). 
146 Moore v. Chertoff, 255 F.R.D. 10, 31 (D.D.C. 2008) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Mojarad v. Aguire, No. Civ. A. 05-0038 CKK, 2006 WL 785415, at *10 (D.D.C. Mar. 
27, 2006)). 
147 Ajaxo Inc. v. Bank of Am. Tech. & Operations, Inc., No. CIV-S-07-0945 GEB GGH, 
2008 WL 5101451, at *2 (E.D. Cal. 2008). 
148 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (g)(3). 
149 See Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05cv1958-B, 2008 WL 66932, at *8 
(S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008), partially vacated and remanded, No. 05CV1958-RMB (BLM), 
2008 WL 638108 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2008). 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XV, Issue 3 
 
 23
judicial power.”150  One approach is to apply a “balancing test” which 
considers the degree of fault, the degree of prejudice, and whether there is 
a lesser sanction that will avoid unfairness and yet deter the conduct by 
others in the future.151    
 
[49]  Although, “[w]hen the conduct [is] willful . . . the focus [is] no 
longer solely on [deterrence and] leveling the playing field.”152  Courts act 
to punish “[w]hen the wrongdoer acted willfully or recklessly and the 
problem could not be corrected.”153  Thus, when discovery abuse is 
particularly egregious, courts issue harsh sanctions.  Examples involving 
e-discovery include Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & 
Co., Inc.,154 Grider v. Keystone Health Plan Central, Inc.,155 Wachtel v. 
Health Net, Inc.,156 Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp.,157 Southern New 
England Telephone Co. v. Global NAPs, Inc.,158 Micron Technology, Inc. 
v. Rambus Inc.,159 and Bray & Gillespie Management LLC v. Lexington 
Insurance Co.160  
                                                 
150 Zambrano v. City of Tustin, 885 F.2d 1473, 1480 (9th Cir. 1989); see id. at 1484 
(vacating the sanctions and fee awards under local district rules because there was no bad 
faith or negligence on the part of the attorney). 
151 See Shira A. Scheindlin & Kanchana Wangkeo, Electronic Discovery Sanctions in the 
Twenty-First Century, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 71, 95 (2004). 
152 Id.  
153 Id. 
154 No. CA 03-5045 AI, 2005 WL 674885, at *9 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 23, 2005) (holding 
“[Morgan Stanley & Co.] has deliberately and contumaciously violated numerous 
discovery orders [and] chose[n] to hide information”). 
155 No. Civ.A.2001-CV-05641, 2007 WL 2874408, at *27-28, *33 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 
2007) (sanctioning lead counsel, associate counsel, law firms and client collectively for 
delaying prosecution in bad faith.). 
156 239 F.R.D. 81, 84, 86-87 (D. N.J. 2006) (imposing severe sanctions where party, 
through its own in-house counsel and top executives, was responsible for egregious 
discovery misconduct). 
157 548 F.3d 1004, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (affirming in part and vacating in part remedy 
ordered by the district court against party based in part on discovery misconduct).     
158 251 F.R.D. 82, 96 (D. Conn. 2008) (entering default judgment to remedy impact of 
“morass of discovery disputes” caused by repeated violations of discovery orders). 
159 255 F.R.D. 135, 150 (D. Del. 2007) (imposing dispositive sanction of unenforceability 
of patents for destruction of documents that party “knew or should have known” would 
become material). 
160 No. 6:07-cv-222-Orl-35KRS, 2009 WL 546429 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 4, 2009) (sanctioning 
counsel, law firm and client for bad faith failure to produce).  
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[50]  Sanctions can be tailored to the perceived cause of the counsel 
misconduct.  Where counsel is sanctioned for conduct that has ethical 
implications, a referral can be made to the appropriate state disciplinary 
authority.  Non-monetary sanctions are often utilized.  In St. Paul 
Reinsurance Co. v. Commercial Financial Corp.,161 counsel [was] ordered 
to “write an article explaining why it [was] improper” to assert certain 
unfounded objections.162  Other courts have published the names of 
counsel in opinions to create a “permanent record” available to legal 
researchers.163  The magistrate judge in Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom 
Corp.164 required retained and in-house counsel to meet under court 
auspices to “identify the failures in the case management and discovery 
protocol utilized by Qualcomm and its . . . attorneys [so as to] prevent 
such failures in the future . . . .”165  This effort was intended to “establish a 
baseline for other cases. . . . [and perhaps] establish a turning point in what 
the Court perceives as a decline in and deterioration of civility, 
professionalism and ethical conduct in the litigation arena.”166  
 
III.  ALLOCATING RESPONSIBILITY FOR SANCTIONS 
 
[51]  The primary responsibility for discovery under the Federal Rules – 
and for satisfying sanctions that result from noncompliance – properly 
resides with parties, given their superior ability to control the manner in 
which discovery obligations are met.167  In the absence of egregious 
                                                 
161 198 F.R.D. 508 (N.D. Iowa 2000). 
162 Id. at 518. 
163 Flaherty v. Filardi, No. 03 Civ. 2167 (LTS)(HBP), 2007 WL 2398762, at *8 n.6  
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2007) (“I hope that the fact that this opinion will, no doubt, be 
reported by the computerized legal research services . . . will be sufficient to provide [a] 
deterrence.”). 
164 No. 05cv1958-B (BLM), 2008 WL 66932 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008). 
165 Id.  at *18 (ordering counsel to participate in the Case Review and Enforcement of 
Discovery Obligations (CREDO) project since they were “integral participants in hiding 
documents and making false statements to the court and jury”). 
166 Id. at *20.  The court entered a stipulation against the use of the CREDO process to 
the prejudice of the participants, implicitly acknowledging the serious potential due 
process issues involved.  See Stipulation and Order Concerning Credo Process at 1-2, 
Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05CV1958-B (BLM) (S.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2008). 
167 See Board of Regents of the Univ. of Neb. v. BASF Corp., No. 4:04CV3356, 2007 
WL 3342423, at *4, *6  (D. Neb. Nov. 5, 2007) (applying sanctions to plaintiff when 
“counsel were far from diligent in complying with the court’s order directing the 
production of the subject documents); see also Keithley v. Home Store.Com, Inc., No. C-
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counsel conduct, most courts apply a mild de facto presumption against 
sanctioning counsel for discovery misconduct, even when the client is 
relatively blameless. 168  As Judge Schiendlin put it in Zubulake V, a party 
on notice of its obligations “acts at its own peril.”169 
 
[52]  The intellectual underpinning of this doctrine is the principle that 
clients are responsible for the acts or omissions of the counsel they 
select.170  In Link v. Wabash Railroad Co.,171 where the party suffered a 
dismissal because of counsel neglect, the Supreme Court refused to 
mitigate the sanctions and noted that “[p]etitioner voluntarily chose this 
attorney as his representative in the action, and he cannot now avoid the 
consequences of the acts or omissions of this freely selected agent.”172    
 
[53]  Among the practical advantages to this approach is that it does not 
immediately create the type of adversity or finger-pointing between clients 
and counsel that triggers the need to retain independent counsel and 
                                                                                                                         
03-04447 SI (EDL), 2008 WL 3833384, at *6 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (holding a failure to 
diligently search well after the eleventh hour for discovery materials compounds the harm 
caused by the lack of a preservation policy). 
168 See, e.g., Malloy v. WM Specialty Mortgage, LLC, 512 F.3d 23, 27 (1st Cir. 2008) 
(affirming sanctions on client, despite fact that counsel could have been sanctioned, given 
that the circuit has consistently ignored claims that clients should not be held responsible 
for counsel’s mistakes). 
169 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake V), 229 F.R.D. 422, 436 (S.D. N.Y. 2004) 
(sanctioning party alone despite failures of in-house and outside counsel to ensure 
adherence to litigation hold by employees). 
170 Alden v. Mid-Mesabi Assocs. Ltd P’ship, No. 06-954 (JRT/RLE), 2008 WL 2828892, 
at *18 (D. Minn. 2008) (“[I]t is far too facile to presume, in the absence of evidence to 
support a presumption, that simply because a client fails to responsibly allow discovery, 
her attorney should be blamed.”). 
171 370 U.S. 626 (1962) (holding the client’s remedy is against the attorney in a suit for 
malpractice). 
172 Id. at 633-34; see Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 
380, 396 (1993) (stating clients must be held accountable for the acts and omissions of 
their attorneys); see also Harry F. Mooney, Sanctions: Prosecuting, Defending and 
Avoiding Malpractice Liability, 59 DEF. COUNS. J. 554, 560 (1992) (“Whether an 
attorney may be responsible to reimburse the client [will depend on] the level of the 
client’s participation in the conduct that gave rise to the sanctions penalty.”). 
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engage in defensive posturing.173  Moreover, it provides an incentive for 
the client to discourage inappropriate lawyer conduct.174   
 
[54]  Sanctioning a party, however, does not preclude also imposing an 
appropriate sanction on counsel when they are primarily responsible for 
the misconduct or were acting without attention to their professional 
responsibilities.175  Courts typically assess sanctions against both counsel 
and client if it is difficult or counterproductive to try to allocate 
culpability.176  In National Ass’n. of Radiation Survivors v. Turnage,177 for 
example, the court directed sanctions at both “the defendant and its 
counsel, since responsibility for the conduct of the litigation was shared 
and since culpability could not be accurately apportioned between the 
two.”178 
 
[55]  Some argue that assessing joint and several liability subverts the 
underlying purpose of provisions like Rule 26(g), since it encourages 
further litigation over culpability.179  The costs and burdens of further 
satellite litigation are such that client and counsel may prefer to accept the 
joint sanctions; thereby saving the judicial system the necessity of 
proceeding with what can be a difficult undertaking in making a more 
precise allocation.   
                                                 
173 See Wachtel v. Health Net, Inc., 239 F.R.D. 81, 103 n.42 (D. N.J. 2006) (describing 
how inside and outside counsel “point[ed] fingers at each other” in regard to 
responsibility for discovery misconduct). 
174 See Grace M. Giesel, Client Responsibility for Lawyer Conduct: Examining the 
Agency Nature of the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 86 NEB. L. REV. 346, 395 (2007) 
(“Any special protection [for the client]  is present in the form of the rules of ethics 
governing attorney conduct, principles of fiduciary duty, and attorney malpractice 
liability.”). 
175 Orgler Homes, Inc. v. Chi. Reg’l Council of Carpenters, No. 06 c 50097, 2008 WL 
5082979 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 24, 2008) (assigning responsibility for sanctions only to 
counsel). 
176 See, e.g., Poole v. Textron, Inc., 192 F.R.D. 494, 511 (D. Md. 2000) (“The Court will 
not attempt to determine how much fault lies with Textron and its inside counsel and how 
much fault lies with outside counsel.”). 
177 115 F.R.D. 543 (N.D. Cal. 1987). 
178 Id. at 558. 
179 See Karen S. Beck, Rule 11 and Its Effect on Attorney/Client Relations, 65 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 875, 889-90 (1992) (noting how “the party more at fault may not be sufficiently 
deterred or punished”).  
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[56]  Some courts perform a culpability allocation of joint responsibility 
only on request.  In the case of In re September 11th Liability Insurance 
Coverage Cases,180 a court imposed sanctions on the party and its counsel 
subject to a request by either for a “more exacting review and 
allocation.”181   
 
[57]  Qualcomm illustrates a fundamental problem that can arise whenever 
relative or comparative fault is sought to be established between client and 
counsel.  In that case, the magistrate judge initially imposed sanctions on 
retained counsel without allowing them to defend their conduct by reliance 
on their communications with their client.182  On appeal to the district 
judge, this ruling was reversed because Qualcomm had introduced 
“accusatory adversity” into the proceedings, thereby undermining the 
logic of the earlier ruling.183  Accordingly, the attorneys had “a due 
process right to defend themselves under the totality of circumstances 
presented in this sanctions hearing.”184 
 
[58]  The matter of assigning culpability is made even more complex 
when the actions of in-house counsel are added to the mix.  Typically 
courts simply avoid the issue and impute the conduct of in-house counsel 
to their employer and sanction the party.  In Bratka v. Anheuser-Busch 
Co.,185 a district judge entered a default judgment against a corporation 
based on the conduct of both in-house and outside counsel.186  In Poole v. 
                                                 
180 243 F.R.D. 114 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).  
181 Id. at 131. 
182 Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05cv1958-B(BLM), 2007 WL 2900537, at *1 
(S.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2007) (denying use of correspondence with client since the “federal 
self-defense exception” does not apply where “the client [has not] initiated any 
complaints or allegations against its attorneys”). 
183 Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No 05CV1958-RMB (BLM), 2008 WL 638108, 
at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2008).   
184 Id. at *3. 
185 164 F.R.D. 448 (S.D. Ohio 1995). 
186 Id. at 463 (entering default judgment as authorized by Rule 37(b)(2)).  The United 
States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio declared that retained counsel 
should have “exercise[d] some degree of oversight” over the internal effort “to ensure 
that their client’s employees are acting competently, diligently and ethically,” and that 
“[t]his was no doubt in accordance with defendant’s wishes. . . . [given] that corporate 
defendants with in-house legal departments often attempt to mitigate the cost of 
litigation, by using in-house counsel to assist trial counsel.”  Id. at 460-61.  
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Textron, Inc.,187 the United States District Court for the District of 
Maryland also sanctioned outside counsel because  the “defense strategy 
[was] the product of the consensus of inside and outside counsel” and 
inside counsel had signed the responses and participated in hearings and in 
open court.188  
 
[59]  Given the Link doctrine, and for other good reasons, it would 
therefore seem appropriate to treat the issue of allocating responsibility for 
discovery misconduct between client and counsel with considerable 
restraint.  
 
IV.  OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
[60]  From the point of view of both client and counsel, there is no 
substitute for making a good faith effort to meet Rule 26(g) discovery 
obligations.189  Most suggestions for procedural fixes to avoid future 
conflict are either overly defensive  or counterproductive.  For example, 
some have argued that outside counsel should “insist” that in-house 
counsel sign discovery responses or that some form of “indemnification” 
from responsibility for discovery sanctions be sought in advance,190 
perhaps as a matter of “informed consent.”191  Others suggest securing an 
advance waiver by the client of the use of privileged communications in 
the event of a dispute over discovery performance.192   
                                                 
187 192 F.R.D. 494 (D. Md. 2000).  
188 Id. at 511. 
189 See Kristine L. Roberts, Qualcomm Fined for “Monumental” E-Discovery 
Violations—Possible Sanctions Against Counsel Remain Pending, LITIG. NEWS ONLINE, 
May 2008, 
http://www.abanet.org/litigation/litigationnews/2008/may/0508_article_qualcomm.html 
(last visited Mar. 23, 2009). 
190 Gregory D. Shelton, Qualcomm v. Broadcom: Lessons for Counsel and a Road Map 
to e-Discovery Preparedness, TECH. & TRIAL TECHNIQUES & TACTICS (IADC, Chicago, 
Ill.), Feb. 2008, at 6, available at 
http://www.williamskastner.com/uploadedFiles/GSheltonQualcommv%20BroadcomIAD
C%20article.pdf.  
191 Beck, supra note 179, at 906-07 (suggesting “[e]x ante sanction-shifting agreements” 
to curtail finger-pointing and to avoid need for attorneys to violate the attorney-client 
privilege to defend themselves).  
192 Posting of David McGowan to 
http://legalethicsforum.typepad.com/blog/2008/01/lessons-from-qu.html (Jan. 9, 2008, 
17:14 EST) (stating that “where outside counsel are not directly responsible for 
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[61]  While these suggestions are logical, they risk distorting the attorney-
client relationship and represent bad public policy.  Clients should not be 
put in the position of having to agree in advance to open-ended 
commitments of that nature in order to secure or keep their counsel.  
Given the choice between losing counsel and agreeing, the pressures to 
sign may be insurmountable.193  As pointed out by attorney and 
commentator Ralph Losey, “[e]thics and professionalism are not 
something that can be papered over with clever agreements.”194 
 
[62]  Responsible conduct in e-discovery matters has been positively 
reinforced by the ongoing paradigm shift towards early and cooperative 
discussion of contentious issues.195  Given this new environment, the most 
realistic course for counsel involves engaging clients in early and, equally 
important, meaningful and ongoing dialogue within the framework of the 
representation established by the engagement.196  Counsel should become 
as knowledgeable as possible under the circumstances about the potential 
custodians, databases, and sources of information and openly consult with 
                                                                                                                         
discovery, they must take steps to protect themselves. . . . [and] demand an advance 
privilege waiver for communications relevant to any discovery disputes”).  
193 See Celegene Corp. v. KV Pharm. Co., No. 07-4819 (SDW), 2008 WL 2937415, at 
*8-10 (D. N.J. July 29, 2008) (disqualifying counsel despite advance waiver signed by in-
house counsel).  Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 1.7, cmt. 22 
(authorizing advance waiver of conflicts), with MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 
1.6, cmt. 10 (limiting occasions that confidential information can be disclosed without 
mentioning advance waiver).  But see Lauren Nicole Morgan, Finding Their Niche: 
Advance Conflicts Waivers Facilitate Industry-Based Lawyering, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 963, 982-84 (2008) (arguing that advance waivers by sophisticated clients should 
be enforced). 
194 e-Discovery Team, http://ralphlosey.wordpress.com/2008/06/01/the-lessons-of-
qualcomm-a-wake-up-call-for-the-whole-legal-profession/ (June 1, 2008 15:53 EST).  
195 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) (requires avoiding discovery whose costs and burdens are 
disproportionally large); see also SEC v. Collins & Aikman Corp., No. 07 Civ. 2419 
(SAS),  2009 WL 94311, at *9 &  n.69 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2009) (noting the Sedona 
Conference Cooperation Proclamation sees the discovery rules as a mandate for counsel 
to act cooperatively). 
196 See Robert B. Collings, Qualcomm v. Broadcomm—Some Lessons for E-Discovery 
Practitioners, 52 BOSTON B.J. 20, 23 (2008) (stating that “outside counsel must be 
vigorous in questioning the client so they can assert that the client has searched for 
responsive documents”). 
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opposing counsel on the most appropriate means to preserve, collect, 
review, and produce e-discovery and other discoverable documents.197  
 
[63]  This approach has already had a direct and measurable impact on 
reducing discovery disputes.198  Creative efforts such as the Sedona 
Conference® Cooperation Proclamation, based on limiting unnecessary 
disputes during discovery, holds out the promise of even more progress in 
the future.199   
 
[64]  The root cause of e-discovery disputes, however, is often a lack of 
dedicated client resources coupled with inadequate internal coordination in 
the face of overwhelming complexity.200  Placing the primary 
responsibility for any resulting discovery sanctions on parties properly 
aligns the incentives with the entity most likely to effectuate change.201  
Where counsel conduct also requires an appropriate sanction, either jointly 
or independently, that task should be accomplished without undermining 
the fundamental principle of party responsibility.   
                                                 
197 See generally Thomas Y. Allman, The Impact of the Proposed Federal E-Discovery 
Rules, 12 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 13, ¶¶ 35-38 (2006). 
198 Rachel Hytken, Comment, Electronic Discovery: To What Extent Do the 2006 
Amendments Satisfy Their Purposes?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 875, 886 (2008) 
(noting since the passage of the amendments, the percentage of orders granting sanctions 
has dropped from 65% to 50% of those sought). 
199 THE SEDONA CONFERENCE® COOPERATION PROCLAMATION 1 (2008), 
http://www.thesedonaconference.org (last visited Mar. 2, 2009) (“The costs associated 
with adversarial conduct in pre-trial discovery have become a serious burden to the 
American judicial system.”). 
200 See Gregory G. Wrobel et al., Counsel Beware: Preventing Spoliation of Electronic 
Evidence in Antitrust Litigation, 20 ANTITRUST 79, 80-81 (2006) (contrasting the broad 
discovery in an antitrust case with the relatively narrow focus of employment 
discrimination cases). 
201 See Giesel, supra note 174, at 349 (noting that clients in today’s legal services market 
are often sophisticated users of legal services and in control of “instrumental or 
ministerial decisions” and “should be held accountable for their agent’s actions”). 
